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The Metaphysical Case against Luck Egalitarianism
Luck egalitarianism is the name of a group of theories of justice that 
subscribes to the idea that a just society compensates for brute luck, but 
does not compensate for bad outcomes that fall under the responsibil-
ity of the agent himself. Notable defenders of versions of the theory are 
Dworkin (2000) and Cohen (1989). It has been argued that this concep-
tion depends on a libertarian account of free will. However, Carl Knight 
(2006) has argued that luck egalitarianism is also a plausible view under 
compatibilist accounts of free will. In this essay I argue that defenders of 
this view fail to distinguish between what Scanlon (1998) calls attribu-
tive and substantive responsibility. Compatibilist accounts of free will and 
responsibility provide an understanding of the former but not the latter 
concept, while the latter is the relevant one for justice. Consequently, if 
the libertarian position on free will is wrong, luck egalitarianism collapses 
into outcome egalitarianism. I argue that, in Dworkin’s terminology, the 
distinction between brute luck and option luck will turn out arbitrary, or 
irrelevant, for justice under Scanlon’s distinction. 
1. Introduction
Responsibility of choice plays a crucial rule in a number of theories of 
distributive justice. Among these is luck egalitarianism, which states that 
a just society compensates for brute bad luck, but not for any event which 
falls under the responsibility of an agent1. There is something very appeal-
ing about the idea that if a person makes a fully informed voluntary choice 
of action, all the consequences that result from it are his to bear. This has 
both a positive and a negative component. If a person decides to start 
his own company which subsequently develops into the most successful 
company in the world, he is entitled to fully enjoy the fruits of his fortune. 
Similarly, if a person decides to use all his money to buy lottery tickets 
and loses, luck egalitarianism holds that a society does not have any duty 
to compensate this unfortunate person for his bad luck. Dworkin (2000) 
makes a useful distinction in this respect. ‘Brute luck’ is the kind of luck 
over which we do not have control. For instance, a person born with a 
handicap does not have control over his condition and its consequences, 
while a person who gambles all his money and loses has bad ‘option luck’: 
the kind of luck over which one does have control. Dworkin argues that in 
a just society brute luck is compensated for but option luck is not. 
By making justice relative to what people choose to do Dworkin cen-
tralizes a complicated concept. The concept of choice has been elaborately 
discussed and criticized in the literature on free will. There is a generally 
accepted idea in both the literature on free will as well as the literature 
on distributive justice that the matter of whether we have free will and 
moral responsibility has great consequences for the field of distributive 
justice. G.A. Cohen, for instance, argues: ‘Someone might say that to 
make choice central to distributive justice lands political philosophy in the 
morass of the free will problem’ (Cohen, 1989: 934). I agree with Cohen 
that this is the case. In the free will literature, authors often think about 
the consequences their claims about free will have on matters of justice. 
Oddly enough, in the literature on distributive justice, the free will debate 
is referenced much less. For instance, Saul Smilansky (1997; 2003) and 
Sung-Hak Kang (2003) note that that political philosophers have down-
played the importance of the free will concepts in their debates. This is 
particularly odd in theories in which choice plays a crucial role, such as 
luck egalitarianism. The motivation behind this neglect appears to be that 
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the issue of free will is a metaphysical issue while distributive justice con-
cerns itself only with practical issues. This essay, however, takes up the 
gauntlet and discusses the importance of the free will debate from the 
perspective of distributive theories of justice. 
A few authors have discussed what kind of freedom is required for 
certain distributive theories of justice in which choice plays an important 
role. In particular, Carl Knight (2006) and Richard Arneson (2004) have 
defended luck egalitarianism from counterarguments related to the free 
will debate. I will argue that they have done so inaptly. The main coun-
terargument against luck egalitarianism is that skepticism about free will 
(the hard determinist position) is plausible and seems to imply that out-
come egalitarianism is the most plausible theory of justice (e.g. Smilansky, 
1997). On the other hand, Knight argues in his paper ‘The Metaphysical 
Case for Luck Egalitarianism’2 (2006) that the luck egalitarian position 
goes very well together with the compatibilist position in the free will 
debate (a similar view is defended in Arneson, 2004). It is against this 
claim that I will argue in this essay. I argue that the difference between 
option luck and brute luck is irrelevant to distributive justice for both hard 
determinists and compatibilists. I will argue that Arneson and Knight do 
not take the distinction between attributive and substantive responsibility 
seriously (Scanlon, 1998). Knight discusses this distinction, but does so 
inappropriately. It follows from my argument that if you are a luck egali-
tarian, your position will collapse into outcome egalitarianism if you are 
not a libertarian about free will. In other words, the distinction between 
brute luck and option luck that Dworkin makes is incompatible with the 
combination of egalitarianism and determinism. There may be good other 
moral reasons why we should allow responsibility-based inequalities to 
subsist. However, given determinism, these cannot be justified from the 
egalitarian starting point.
In this essay I shall first review the positions in the free will debate 
and explain the problem hard determinism poses for luck egalitarianism 
(Section II). This will make apparent what the close relation is between 
metaphysics and political philosophy. Secondly, I will take a closer look at 
Knight’s claim that luck egalitarianism and compatibilism are compatible 
(Section III). I will then introduce Scanlon’s distinction between attributive 
and substantive responsibility, after which I show that while determinism 
is plausible with regard to some notions of free will and moral responsi-
bility, it is quite another matter whether determinism is also compatible 
with desert-entailing versions of moral responsibility and free will. Thirdly, 
some counterarguments by Knight (2006) will be considered, and I will 
argue that they do not help his case in light of the arguments presented in 
this essay (section 4). 
2. Hard determinism and egalitarianism
Determinism is 
incompatible with free 
will
Determinism is com-
patible with free will
Determinism is 




compatibilists:  a rare 
position)
Table 1: A taxonomy of the free will debate.
There are a number of positions in the free will debate (see table 1). The 
first divide is between those who believe that determinism is true and those 
who believe that it is not. The second divide is between those who believe 
that determinism is a threat for free will (incompatibilists) and those who 
do not think so (compatibilists). There are roughly three positions within 
the debate. Firstly, there are those that believe that determinism is true 
and people have free will, such that for all decisions a person makes, he 
could have chosen otherwise (e.g. Kane, 2007). This position is called the 
libertarian position in the free will debate (not to be confused with the 
position in political philosophy due to, among others, Robert Nozick). 
The second position has been called the hard determinist position. Those 
who hold this position argue that as a result of the way we understand the 
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world as a causal, determined, system, there is only one possible course 
of action an agent can take. This implies that the freedom we ascribe to 
agents is an illusion. In short, there is no free will such that for every action 
an agent undertakes, he could have done otherwise. Both the libertarians 
and the hard determinists hold that free will and a deterministic world 
are incompatible (the second divide), but disagree on the plausibility of 
the determinism thesis (the first divide). The third position, that of com-
patibilism, holds that whether we have a free will, and the related matter 
of whether we can be held morally responsible for our deeds, does not 
depend on the truth of determinism. According to them, even though 
determinism is (likely) true, the concept of free will is compatible with 
a deterministic worldview. I will now discuss hard determinism in more 
detail with the purpose of showing how it undermines luck egalitarianism.
2.1 Hard determinism
Hard determinism subscribes to both incompatibilism and determinism. 
The classical version of hard determinism takes determinism to entail that 
the state of the world as it is today is a closed function of the state of the 
world as it was yesterday and all the causal laws of nature that work upon 
it. Humans do not fall outside of the causal system of natural laws. This 
thesis worries many, as it seems to leave no room for spontaneity or free 
agency, and thereby creates a concern with regards to the possibility of 
moral responsibility. Generally, by moral responsibility we mean to say 
that a person is to blame if he does something wrong and praiseworthy if 
he did something right. However, if determinism is true a person could 
not have done otherwise because the laws of nature determine his path of 
action as much as they determine the flow of a river. If we blame a person, 
we often mean to say: ‘you should have done otherwise, and because you 
did not, you are to blame’. The hard determinist maintains that because 
the first part of the sentence is undermined by determinism (a person 
could not have done otherwise), he is not to blame for his actions.
This can be illustrated as follows: consider two people who both 
have similar, peaceful backgrounds and both go off to college. At their 
first college party they both get offered a sniff of cocaine. One decides to 
take it while the other decides not to. The cocaine sniffer unfortunately 
becomes addicted, ends up being expelled, and loses everything, while 
the other does well in college, graduates within four years and manages 
to get a good life for himself. Is the cocaine sniffer responsible? Yes, our 
intuition says. After all, he was fully aware of the risks of the drug, and 
knew he could get expelled for its usage. At the same time, his fellow 
college freshman remains clean. This seems to imply that another path 
could have been chosen. At the same time, the difference between the 
cocaine sniffer and his clean friend could be explained by differences 
in character. Some people are sensitive to peer pressure and impulsion. 
Others are prudent decision makers, and can inhibit themselves much 
better. Prudence is not something one chooses to have. One may choose 
at some point to start making prudent decisions. However, whether this 
occurs at all, and whether one can implement one’s choice depends on 
the way a person is, mentally. And this, in the end, seems to be a product 
of both genes and environment, neither of which are under the person’s 
own control.
Modern determinists often maintain that the threat to free will does 
not lie in the fact that everything is perfectly determined. After all, quan-
tum mechanical randomness is radical indeterminism at a fundamental 
level, but it does not provide any reason why the coke sniffer could have 
chosen otherwise in a morally relevant sense. The real threat is posed by the 
implication that we are part of the causal universe as much as everything 
else. Scanlon (1998) calls this thesis the Causal thesis3. One way in which 
the threat of the causal thesis to responsibility has been phrased, due to 
Galen Strawson (1994), is to say that any character trait that is important 
to decision making is either given (by nature and education) or chosen. 
However, if it is chosen, there are other character traits that caused this 
decision. This creates an infinite regress: all choices depend on character 
traits, depend on character traits depend on character traits… However, at 
the end of this regress, there cannot be said to be an non-chosen, uncaused 
self that truly has chosen the character one has and can be held responsible 
for the choices that it makes. Therefore, when I refer to hard determinism, 
I do not mean that no laws of nature are probabilistic. What is important 
is that we are part of a causal system.
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2.2 Egalitarianism and determinism
In this essay I shall use Arneson’s (2004) definition of luck egalitarianism. 
While Dworkin himself did not like the label much, I think Arneson’s 
description is very helpful. According to Arneson, luck egalitarianism 
is egalitarianism plus what he calls luckism. Egalitarianism as Arneson 
describes it either means that those who are worst off should get priority 
(prioritism) or that the aim should be to make everyone as equally well 
off as possible. For Rawls, Dworkin and Cohen there are reasons why ine-
qualities should be allowed. Rawls relates this to efficiency-considerations 
that will benefit the group in society that is worst off (his famous difference 
principle; Rawls: 1971). Dworkin and Cohen relate this to responsibility. 
For Arneson this relates to responsibility and luck: ‘Luckism is the idea 
that the strength of any moral reasons there might be to alter the condi-
tion of some individual for the better or for the worse (if the latter, this is 
to be done for the sake of improving the condition of other individuals) 
can be amplified or dampened by some factor involving an assessment of 
individual responsibility.’ (Arneson, 2004: 2). The luck egalitarian posi-
tion is that all bad luck should be compensated for, except if a person is 
responsible for it himself. Both Dworkin and Cohen support a version of 
this view. Their views differ in that Cohen believes opportunities should 
be equalized, whereas Dworkin believes that differences in resources due 
to ‘brute luck’ is the relevant unit to be equalized (however, Dworkin does 
believe that ambitions, even if they are due to luck, should play an impor-
tant role in income distribution; Dworkin, 2000). 
It should be noted that there is an important relation between the egali-
tarian belief in equality and luckism. Egalitarianism is often motivated by 
the idea that much of what determines a person’s life (e.g. his place of birth 
and the genes he is born with) falls completely outside of the responsibility 
of a person and is therefore, in Rawls’s words, ‘morally arbitrary’. There are 
no moral reasons why a person who has had bad luck should suffer its con-
sequences. This is what I take to be the core of egalitarianism4. I shall refer 
to this fundamental motivation of egalitarianism as the Egalitarian Proviso. 
Both luckism and the Egalitarian Proviso say that what falls outside the 
scope of one’s responsibility should not affect a person. Crucial though is 
that luckism provides a deviation from the position that equality is always 
good. A very unequal society may be fully just according to the luck egali-
tarian, if the inequalities are due to choices for which the involved citizen is 
fully responsible. It is the claim that responsibility is a relevant criterion for 
distributive justice that is crucial to the luck egalitarian. 
How do hard determinism and luck egalitarianism relate to one 
another? Luck may be a somewhat ambiguous concept, but in its sim-
plest form, luck is the opposite of what someone is responsible for. Susan 
Hurley (2002) argues in favor of this definition (and calls it thin luck). 
Hard determinism holds that whatever action a person undertakes, it is 
always a product of causes outside of him, and he is not responsible for 
any. He cannot do otherwise. For the hard determinist anything that hap-
pens to a person ultimately falls outside the scope of his responsibility. 
Smilansky (1997: 156) words it as follows: ‘if people lack the sort of self-
creating ability which only libertarian free will might have provided us 
with, then ultimately everything - including a person’s choice - must be 
viewed as arbitrary, and cannot ultimately be seen as up to the person.’ 
The way a person is, if we take the hard determinist’s words for it, ‘is as 
brute luck as it gets’ (Ibid.). In other words, within the hard determinist’s 
worldview there is no room for responsibility and everything is luck. In 
our example: whether someone is prudent or not is luck in its purest sense 
to the hard determinist. Therefore, whether someone has a good life as a 
college graduate or a bad one as a drug addicted college drop-out will turn 
out to be a matter of luck too.
To be fair, Dworkin (2000) did not define option luck in terms of 
responsibility, but in terms of deliberate action, and brute luck as luck that 
could not have been anticipated. The distinction itself is not undermined 
by hard determinism, but its moral relevance does seem to be affected by 
this. The distinction between brute luck and option luck only seems to be 
morally relevant if, in case of option luck, a person could have done other-
wise. A gamble may be deliberately chosen, but if a person can only accept 
the gamble, being unable to do otherwise, the fact that the choice was 
deliberate does not appear to be morally relevant. In fact, making distri-
butions sensitive to deliberate choice, if determinism is true, is in conflict 
with the Egalitarian Proviso, which maintains that all consequences of bad 
luck should be compensated for. If everything that happens to a person, 
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including his personality, is a product of luck, then losses incurred through 
irresponsible action should be compensated for. 
Another way to phrase the problem is by means of Dworkin’s dis-
tinction between endowments and ambitions. The latter are properties for 
which one is responsible, while the former are a matter of luck. However, 
if we take determinism seriously, ambitions and endowments are not dif-
ferent in any morally relevant sense. One way to phrase it is to say that 
ambitions are also endowments. According to Dworkin, distributions 
should be endowment-insensitive and ambition-sensitive. If ambitions are 
seen as a subset of endowments though, it is easy to see that this statement 
leads to contradictions.  
The relation between egalitarian justice and hard determinism appears 
to be twofold. Firstly, hard determinism argues powerfully that much 
of a person’s position in life is due to moral luck and therefore arbitrary. 
According to Kang (2003), who downplays the importance of the free will 
debate for political thought, it is undeniable that determinism gives very 
strong support for egalitarian justice. It is even the case, he argues, that 
much of the force of egalitarianism is drawn from the determinist posi-
tion, and little of it would still be convincing if determinism were false. 
The Egalitarian Proviso states that what a person is not responsible for 
should not negatively affect his life. Determinism seriously diminishes the 
scope of what we can be responsible for. Therefore, egalitarianism as the 
view that our society should be as equal as is possible (or feasible) seems to 
combine very well with the idea of determinism.
The second relation between hard determinism and egalitarianism is 
that hard determinism urges any egalitarian to become an outcome egali-
tarian, as it denies the moral significance of responsibility. While many (or 
perhaps all) egalitarians will accept that much of a person’s life happens due 
to luck, Cohen and Dworkin do not accept that everything that happens 
in our lives falls outside the scope of our responsibility. This urges them 
to believe that redistribution should be limited to giving everyone equal 
opportunities (for Cohen), and correcting for brute luck (for Dworkin). 
Acknowledging that hard determinism is true implies that no one is mor-
ally responsible for his actions, and therefore all that happens to a person 
is luck. Combined with the Egalitarian Proviso that bad luck should be 
compensated for, this view would collapse the luck egalitarian view into 
outcome egalitarianism. In other words, it would make luckism an empty 
criterion for justice. Also, it would make Cohen’s thesis incoherent with 
the Egalitarian Proviso (see Smilansky, 1997). After all, equal opportuni-
ties will almost certainly have better consequences for the prudent. And 
these are, in the hard determinism view, simply the lucky. In short, hard 
determinism compels one to become an outcome egalitarian. 
3. Does compatibilism offer reassurance?
Despite the above, luck egalitarianism has a very strong intuitive appeal. 
For many, the argument made above may not seem so worrying. After all, 
its argumentative force against luck egalitarianism depends heavily on the 
truth of hard determinism. While this view is certainly not outdated, it 
is certainly not mainstream either and remains a somewhat controversial 
position in the free will debate. Luck egalitarians have found reassurance 
in an alternative view: compatibilism (e.g. Knight, 2006; Arneson, 2004). 
This view holds that while determinism is plausible, it certainly does not 
follow from determinism that free will does not exist and responsibility 
is impossible. In this section I will discuss the claim that compatibilism 
offers an escape from the threat that determinism poses to the concept of 
responsibility and see whether this can save luck egalitarianism. 
Central to many versions of compatibilism is the idea that the option 
to do otherwise is not necessary for responsibility and moral appraisal. 
This view was introduced by Frankfurt (1969). The idea is this: if it is 
possible to ascribe to a person a desire that is truly his (in Frankfurt’s 
framework: he wants it and he wants to want it, and he may even want to 
want to want it), and a person takes the desired course of action, we can 
say that this person is responsible for this action. If it is something that 
we approve of we may say ‘well done’, or we may say ‘this person is a very 
good person’, without being wrong: even if determinism were true.  This 
view of responsibility relates to action ownership: if an action truly falls 
under a person’s desires, truly belongs to a person, such that we can say 
that it is typical behavior of his, we can attribute responsibility to him. 
There are several accounts of how responsibility can retain meaning in a 
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deterministic world. An important version of compatibilism is developed 
by Peter Strawson (1962). He argues that what we call moral responsibility 
is the idea that we see people such that their actions make it appropriate 
that we hold a reactive attitude against them. A reactive attitude is an emo-
tional response to moral behavior, and moral judgment is holding such a 
reactive attitude from a third person perspective. Even if determinism is 
true, he argues, it still makes sense to hold someone responsible for doing 
something immoral (e.g. killing someone), in the sense that you change 
your attitude towards him. Compatibilism seems to provide us with some 
great instruments to fight off the worries raised by determinism. Such, for 
instance, is the position of Carl Knight (2006). 
3.1 Scanlon’s account
Scanlon (1998) sheds some light on the discussion of moral appraisal, 
desert and responsibility in the compatibilist account. Firstly, he makes an 
important distinction between two types of responsibility that often get 
mixed up, particularly in political debates. A person can be said to be attrib-
utively responsible for an action if he is subject to moral praise or blame for 
this actions. This relates to both Frankfurt (1969) and Strawson’s (1962) 
account of responsibility. If a person truly owns an action, it is truly attrib-
utable to him: he can be said to be attributively responsible for it. A person 
is substantively responsible for an action if a person cannot complain about 
its consequences, because it was his own choice. This is the kind of respon-
sibility we apply to those who did not buy car insurance and complain 
about the fact that they have to pay the full costs of the repairs when their 
car breaks down. Similarly, it is the kind of responsibility we apply when 
someone works hard for an achievement, and we feel that this achievement 
is thus well-deserved. According to Scanlon these two types of responsibil-
ity need not necessarily coincide. In particular, one can be held attributively 
responsible if one is not substantively responsible for an action.  
This is exemplified in Scanlon’s (1998) analysis of the well-known 
Frankfurt cases (1969), for instance, the willing addict. Frankfurt estab-
lishes the willing addict as a famous counterexample to the view that 
responsibility requires the opportunity to do otherwise. An addict takes 
drugs because he cannot do otherwise: he is, after all, addicted. The will-
ing addict truly wants to take the drug. Even if he were not addicted, he 
would take the drug. In other words, even though he could not do oth-
erwise, the action is truly his: the taking of the drug can be attributed to 
him, and not just to his addiction. In Scanlon’s terminology, the willing 
addict is attributively responsible for taking the drug. But Scanlon would 
also argue that because he could not do otherwise, he is not substantially 
responsible for it. 
Scanlon argues that if the causal thesis is true, this should have no 
effect attributive responsibility. This is what many compatibilist accounts 
have taught us. However, substantive responsibility, according to him, 
implies that the person in question could have acted otherwise, but did 
not do so. The attribution of substantive responsibility to people, there-
fore, is undermined by determinism. In case of the willing addict, Scanlon 
argues that the fact that he is not willing to do otherwise should not have 
as a consequence that he forfeits the community’s duty to aid him. Simi-
larly, if determinism is correct, it means that we can never do otherwise. 
In other words, we can never be substantially responsible for our actions. 
On Scanlon’s account, this implies that moral appraisal is still appropriate, 
but that we can never say that a person has brought about his own fate, 
and therefore has forfeited our duty to help him. In his own words: ‘In this 
respect our attitude toward those who suffer or are blamed should not be 
“You asked for this”, but rather “There but for the grace of God go I”’ 
(Scanlon, 1998: 294). 
Scanlon’s distinction between attributive and substantial responsibil-
ity clarifies the disagreement between compatibilists and incompatibilists 
about free will. According to Scanlon (1998), attributive responsibility may 
be compatible with determinism, but this is not the kind of responsibil-
ity that is relevant to questions of justice. Note that Dworkin’s distinction 
between option luck and brute luck is about something similar to attributive 
responsibility. On Scanlon’s account the relevance of Dworkin’s distinction 
is irrelevant with respect to what a person deserves or does not deserve, if 
determinism is true. Again, if determinism is true, people cannot be said 
to have substantive responsibility. And it is substantial responsibility that is 
relevant to defend the moral non-arbitrariness of luck egalitarianism. The 
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idea that responsibility of choice justifies inequalities rests on the idea of sub-
stantive responsibility, and not attributive responsibility. The fact that we can 
ascribe an action to an agent, such that he is attributively responsible for it, 
should have no consequence for what his due is, if there is no way he could 
have done otherwise. In Scanlon’s account an agent may be attributively 
responsible for an action, while, as he could not have done otherwise, its 
consequences should be seen as luck. The difference between substantive and 
attributive responsibility is that substantive responsibility is desert-entailing, 
while attributive responsibility is not. Now, a version of responsibility that is 
not desert-entailing does not seem to be of much importance for distributive 
theory. Thus, compatibilism may offer us many useful tools to save the moral 
terminology in a deterministic world, but compatibilistic freedom cannot 
give us desert-entailing responsibility. The difference between the accounts is 
worded nicely by Fleurbaey (1995: 40): ‘Even if a compatibilist account may 
provide grounds for moral attitudes of praise and dispraise, it is more ques-
tionable whether it could justify differences of welfare or advantage between 
people.’ In short, Scanlon’s account of responsibility states that attributive 
responsibility is compatible with determinism, but is not desert-entailing, 
while substantive responsibility may be desert-entailing, but is not compat-
ible with determinism. Compatibilism in the free will debate may provide 
us with attributive, but not with substantive responsibility. Compatibalism 
can thus not provide any desert-entailing version of responsibility, which is 
required for luck egalitarianism. 
4. Knight’s defence of luck egalitarianism
In fact, Knight (2006) considers Scanlon’s distinction, but does so inad-
equately. Knight presents two reasons why Scanlon’s conclusion with 
respect to substantive responsibility need not worry the luck egalitarian. 
The first is that praise and blame may be enough to justify responsibility 
based inequalities. The second is that libertarianism may still be correct.
Knight’s first argument is that it seems implausible to him that praise 
and blame can be disconnected from substantive desert-entailing responsi-
bility. According to Scanlon, it does not follow from the fact that a person 
has conducted praiseworthy behaviour that it would be just to reward him. 
Similarly blameworthy behaviour does not imply that it would be just to 
punish. This sounds implausible to Knight. He argues that it would be 
highly counterintuitive to shake the hand of those who act maliciously. 
‘Assuming that such persons are, determinism notwithstanding, respon-
sible for their behavior, it may well strike us as wrong to subsidize their 
reprehensible choices.’ (Knight, 2006: 183). This argument can be under-
stood in two ways. I shall discuss the two interpretations briefly.
Firstly, this argument can be understood as an argument in favour of 
intuitions versus metaphysical conclusions. In this case, we can say that 
while Knight’s premise about our intuitions is surely correct: not mak-
ing the wrong-doer pay may be counter-intuitive. However, the implicit 
premise underlying his argument is surely false: if our intuition goes against 
a metaphysical conclusion, the metaphysical conclusion is to be rejected. 
The point of drawing on arguments from the free will debate for the dis-
tributive justice discussion is exactly that it may show us that some of our 
intuitions may be wrong. Moreover, the intuitions for the luck egalitarian 
case are far from unambiguous. Anderson (1999) famously summarized 
a large number of counter-intuitive examples that highlight that the luck 
egalitarian is very uncompassionate if he meets a person in need who has 
not been particularly prudent in his decision making. 
Secondly, Knight’s argument can be understood as a consequentialist, 
or paternalistic, argument: while it may not be the fault of the impru-
dent that he has acted imprudently, rewarding him for bad behaviour 
may encourage this kind of behaviour. Therefore, we should not do it. 
It is notable that Scanlon, while arguing for his distinction between two 
kinds of responsibility, also considers the great value of deliberate choice. 
Encouraging people to choose and be held accountable for their choices 
has many advantages. Scanlon (1998) argues that being held accountable 
for your own order in a restaurant ensures you get the dish that most 
accords with your taste. I think this is a very important consideration, but 
it diverges from the statement that responsibility based inequalities should 
subsist because they are just. It is rather a statement about efficiency. This 
may be an important consideration for questions of distribution. Rawls’ 
(1971) Difference Principle is a famous example of a distributive rule that 
takes into account efficiency concerns. He acknowledges that inequalities 
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may be efficiency enhancing and that rather than striving for a completely 
equal society, inequalities should be allowed if they benefit the worst off. 
However, luck egalitarians do not make responsibility central to their 
account because of efficiency concerns, but because they believe that it is 
just in itself. Knight may argue that choice is important for efficiency, but 
does not thereby also show that it is just. 
Knight’s second argument is that even if Scanlon is right, and com-
patibilism cannot provide us with an account of substantive responsibility, 
it need not imply that luck egalitarianism is wrong. After all, luck egalitari-
anism would still be substantially different from outcome egalitarianism 
if libertarianism were correct. This is surely correct. However, it needs to 
be acknowledged that the libertarian position in the free will debate is not 
a very plausible one5. It is particularly striking that Knight himself writes 
that the critique that luck egalitarianism draws upon a libertarian position 
in the free will debate is ‘particularly damaging’ (Knight, 2006: 174). The 
plausibility of the view notwithstanding, Knight is right to assert that luck 
egalitarianism remains to be a substantive view if one maintains a libertar-
ian position in the free will debate6. 
5. Conclusion
In this essay I have discussed the relation between luck egalitarianism and 
the free will debate. There appears to be a widely held view amongst luck 
egalitarians that while their notion of luck is tightly linked to the concept 
of free will, their position is not dependent on the libertarian position in 
the free will debate (Arneson, 2004, Knight, 2006). They argue that while 
hard determinism may be a threat to their view as a substantive theory that 
is different from outcome egalitarianism, compatibilism offers a way out. 
However, I have argued that this argument does not distinguish between 
Scanlon’s two accounts of responsibility. While compatibilist accounts 
offer satisfactory accounts of attributive responsibility, compatibilism 
cannot deliver substantive responsibility: the desert-entailing kind. The 
conflation of these two concepts has confused the argument.
The consequence of this argument is not that luck egalitarianism, as 
a distinct theory from outcome egalitarianism, is implausible. While the 
libertarian position in the free will debate is unpopular, it still has some 
defenders. Both Arneson and Knight therefore claim that we should regard 
the issue as unsettled. Hence, we should not draw any drastic conclusions 
from the debate. One the other hand, in the more plausible case that lib-
ertarianism is false, the point made in this article has as a consequence that 
the ‘luck’ in luck egalitarianism should disappear. In this case, luckism 
becomes an empty concept, and luck egalitarianism collapses into out-
come egalitarianism. 
The luck egalitarian project was a clear and principled divergence from 
the outcome egalitarian project. The conclusion that luck egalitarianism 
collapses into outcome egalitarianism if determinism is true, may therefore 
not be a welcome conclusion to the luck egalitarian. Finally, though he 
may rest assured that much of what he has argued for in terms of justice 
may still be relevant in terms of efficiency, and could therefore still be an 
appealing political idea.
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Notes
1. Another group of theories in which responsibility plays a crucial role are theories that 
use the capability approach. While these will not be discussed in this essay, many of the 
considerations will apply to those theories too.
2. It is this title that has inspired mine.
3. For this reason, hard determinist might be a bit of a misnomer. Free will skeptic would 
perhaps be better suited. For reasons of tradition and clarity, I shall stick to hard determi-
nism.
4. Some other evidence of can be found in the definitions of G.A. Cohen and Larry Temkin. 
Cohen puts it as follows: ‘a large part of the fundamental egalitarian aim is to extinguish 
the influence of brute luck on distribution’ (Cohen, 1989: 931). Similarly, Larry Temkin 
writes: ‘In particular, I believe egalitarians have the deep and (for them) compelling view 
that it is bad—unjust and unfair—for some to be worse off than others through no fault of 
their own.’ (Temkin, 1993: 101).
5. For an attempt at a knock-down argument against libertarianism see Strawson (1994). 
This is a much debated paper, which I think has not been convincingly rebutted so far. 
However, it has not convinced all, as there are still some who argue for libertarianism in the 
free will debate (see Kane, 2007). We have to conclude that Strawson’s argument remains 
controversial.
6. However, if we take Kang’s (2003) argument seriously, much of the force of egalitarian-
ism is lost if determinism is false.
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